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THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Marco Roscini*
This Article discusses the competences and powers of the UN Security Council in securing 
compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular through the adoption of the 
measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter.  The competence of the Council in this ﬁeld
can be founded on several legal grounds: on a broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to 
the peace” (Article 39 of the Charter), on Article 94(2) with regard to the International Court 
of Justice’s judgments establishing violations of the jus in bello and also on the customary 
duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as reﬂected in Article 1 Common
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of the Victims of War.  In particular, such 
customary provision empowers the Security Council to react to any violation of international 
humanitarian law regardless of a nexus with concerns of international stability.  Although the 
Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to violations of the laws of war, the most 
incisive ones are those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, which however are not 
without problems.  The role the Security Council has played in the enforcement of international 
humanitarian law has been criticized because of its selective and opportunistic approach, 
which is due to the political nature of the organ.  Also, in several instances the Council, far 
from securing compliance with the jus in bello, has instead interfered with its application. 
However selective and imperfect the Council’s approach might be, though, its power to adopt 
decisions binding on UN members and its competence to take or authorize coercive measures 
involving the use of force make it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations 
of international humanitarian law, partly remedying the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the 
treaties on the laws of war.
* PhD in International Law, University of Rome “La Sapienza,” Reader in International Law, 
University of Westminster, mroscini@iol.it. 
This Article is an extended and revised version of a paper presented by the author at the Conference 
on “Securing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law” organized by the Minerva Center 
for Human Rights (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and the  International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Jerusalem, November 22-24, 2009).  I am grateful to the participants of that conference, to 
Yaël Ronen and to the anonymous referees of this journal for their comments.  The usual caveat 
applies.  This Article is based on developments as of June 30, 2010 and all websites were also last 
visited on that date.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the UN Security Council’s competences and powers to secure 
compliance with international humanitarian law.1  In the ﬁrst twenty years of its
existence (1945-1967), which have been appropriately labeled the “tabula rasa 
period,”2 the Council totally ignored jus in bello issues.  The ﬁrst explicit reference
to international humanitarian law in a Security Council resolution was in Resolution 
237 (1967) following the Six Days’ War in the Middle East, recommending that 
the governments concerned comply with the Geneva Conventions.3  In the 1970s-
1980s, the Council reluctantly started to engage with international humanitarian law: 
In Resolution 436 (1978) on Lebanon, for instance, for the ﬁrst time it expressly
referred to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).4  During this period, 
however, many armed conﬂicts involving violations of international humanitarian law
were ignored by the Council or dealt with at a very late stage.5  After the end of the 
Cold War, the Council’s role as an “international policeman” became more palpable 
and expanded to very diversiﬁed situations, including violations of the laws of war.
References to international humanitarian law in Security Council resolutions grew 
more frequent due to the proliferation of non-international armed conﬂicts generating
an increasing number of civilian casualties. At the same time the Council started to 
make use of its Chapter VII powers.6
The focus of the present Article is on the enforcement of international humanitarian 
law by the Security Council through coercive measures, rather than on other aspects 
of implementation:  As noted by Abi-Saab, enforcement involves “exercising coercive 
1 This Article uses “international humanitarian law,” “jus in bello,” “laws of war,” and “law of 
armed conﬂict” synonymously.
2 Theodoor A. van Baarda, The Involvement of the Security Council in Maintaining International 
Humanitarian Law, 12 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 137, 142 (1994).
3 S.C. Res. 237, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (June 14, 1967). 
4 S.C. Res 436, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/436 (Oct. 6, 1978) calls upon all involved to allow the 
ICRC into the conﬂict area to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance.
5 Gregor Schotten & Anke Biehler, The Role of the UN Security Council in Implementing 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 312 (Roberta Arnold & 
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008).  It appears that, during this period, the Council mainly focused on the 
Middle East and the Palestinian Occupied Territories, the conﬂict between Iran and Iraq and the
invasion of Kuwait (Christiane Bourloyannis, The Security Council of the United Nations and the 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 335, 353 (1992)).
6 MARÍA TERESA COMELLAS AGUIRREZÁBAL, LA INCIDENCIA DE LA PRÁCTICA DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD 
EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO 24 (2007).
332 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:330
pressure on the deviant subject to realign his conduct to the prescriptions of the rules,” 
while implementation, which is a broader concept, also includes “direct application by 
the subjects of the legal system, or the addressees of its rules” and “determinations by 
third parties—ideally judicial, but could be quasi-judicial instances as well—in case 
of dispute as to the proper application by the subjects.”7  In addition, this Article deals 
speciﬁcally neither with measures taken with regard to the protection of particular
vulnerable groups (e.g., women and children),8 nor with the role that the Security 
Council has played in the normative development of the law of armed conﬂict.9  Section 
II determines the legal grounds of the Security Council’s competence to enforce 
international humanitarian law, while Section III discusses Chapter VII measures that 
have been used to react to violations of the jus in bello.  The problems related to the 
enforcement of international humanitarian law by the Security Council will ﬁnally be
examined, in particular its selective approach and the instances in which the Council, 
instead of enforcing, has actually interfered with the application of the laws of war.
I. IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMPETENT TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW?
A. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS A “THREAT TO THE PEACE”
The UN Charter does not contain any express reference to international humanitarian 
law.  If “respect for human rights” is mentioned among the purposes of the United 
Nations in Article 1(3), no mention of the laws and customs of war appears in either 
Article 1 or 2.  This omission was intentional, as the drafters saw any reference 
to the jus in bello as an implicit recognition that, in spite of Article 2(4) and the 
collective security mechanisms provided in the Charter, armed conﬂicts could not be
prevented.10  “Human rights” have however been interpreted broadly in UN fora since 
7 Georges Abi-Saab, Conclusions, in LES NATIONS UNIES ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE : 
ACTES DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL À L’OCCASION DU CINQUANTIÉME DE L'ONU 307 N.8 307 (Luigi 
Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa & Sylvie Scherrer eds., 1996). 
8 On securing compliance with the provisions protecting children in armed conﬂict, see Matthew 
Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conﬂict: Harnessing the Security Council’s “Soft Power,” 
43 ISR. L. REV. 360 (2010).  On the protection of women, see Anke Biehler, Protection of Women in 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in Arnold and Quénivet, supra note 5, at 
355, 372-75.
9 On this aspect, see COMELLAS AGUIRREZÁBAL, supra note 6, at 201 ff.
10 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly [1949] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 281, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/13.  See Schotten & Biehler, supra note 5, at 311.
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the 1960s: the notion of “human rights in armed conﬂict,” which includes international
humanitarian law, was introduced at the 1968 UN International Conference on Human 
Rights in Teheran and was later reafﬁrmed in several General Assembly resolutions,
starting with Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of December 19, 1968.11  Resolution 9/9 (2008) 
of the UN Human Rights Council has also clearly stated that “conduct that violates 
international humanitarian law ... may also constitute a gross violation of human 
rights.”12
Nonetheless, the fact that promoting and encouraging respect for international 
humanitarian law can now be considered one of the UN purposes does not necessarily 
mean that the Security Council is competent to act to achieve that purpose. Indeed, 
the main responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter is to maintain 
international peace and security (Article 24(1)) rather than to ensure that hostilities are 
conducted in accordance with the jus in bello.  The Charter, thus, makes the Council 
the arbiter of when armed force can be used, but does not say anything about how this 
force can be employed:13 as noted by Judge Fitzmaurice, “[i]t was to keep the peace, 
not to change the world order, that the Security Council was set up.”14  In particular, 
the problem with using Chapter VII enforcement powers to secure compliance with 
international humanitarian law is that, as is well-known, according to Article 39 of 
the Charter those powers can be invoked by the Council only in case of a “threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” as their purpose is to keep the 
peace and not to enforce the law.15  It is however quite possible that these two goals 
occasionally coincide.  The question is whether a breach of international humanitarian 
law can be considered by the Security Council a “threat to the peace.”16  Although 
11 G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2444(XXIII) (Dec. 19, 1968).
12 Human Rights Council Res. 9/9, Annual Reports of the HRC, 9th Sess., 
Sept. 9-24, 2008, A/HRC/RES/9/9 at 1 (Sept. 18, 2008).  As observed in the 
Commentary to Article 89 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
 “[a]cting for the protection of man, also in time of armed conﬂict, accords with the aims of the
United Nations no less than does the maintenance of international peace and security” (COMMENTARY 
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 para. 
3596 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987)).
13 James D. Fry, The UN Security Council and the Law of Armed Conﬂict: Amity or Enmity?, 38 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 333 (2006).
14 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 
16, 294, para. 115 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion] (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Fitzmaurice).
15 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1950).
16 The other two situations triggering Chapter VII powers, breaches of peace and acts of 
aggression, refer to the outbreak of an inter-state armed conﬂict.
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the drafters regarded  this concept as linked to the international use of armed force,17 
its scope has been progressively expanded by the Council.18  Koskenniemi has 
highlighted the Security Council’s “willingness to use its exceptionally ‘hard’ powers 
of enforcement, binding resolutions, economic sanctions and military force for ‘soft’ 
purposes of international justice.”19  He claims that “[t]he sense of ‘peace’ has been 
widened from the (hard) absence of the use of armed force by a State to change the 
territorial status quo to the (soft) conditions within which … peace in its ‘hard’ sense 
depends.”20  It can thus be argued that, although in principle the primary function of 
the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security, which 
is not necessarily identical to the remedying of internationally wrongful acts, in 
practice there has been a signiﬁcant overlap, with the Council qualifying the most
diverse breaches of international law as constituting threats to the peace.21  The nexus 
between the maintenance of peace and ‘humanitarian’ considerations was initially 
emphasized in the 1992 statement by the President of the Security Council on behalf 
of its members: 
The absence of war and military conﬂicts among States does not
in itself ensure international peace and security.  The non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological ﬁelds have become threats to peace and security.  The
United Nations membership as a whole, working through the 
appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution 
of these matters.22 
Violations of international humanitarian law were expressly considered as a threat 
to the peace by the Security Council for the ﬁrst time in Resolution 808 (1993) with
17 INGER ÖSTERDAHL, THREAT TO PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 
39 OF THE UN CHARTER 85 (1998).
18 It is well-known that the drafters of the Charter deliberately left the notion undeﬁned (United
Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents, Vol. XII, 1945, 505).
19 Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View, 
6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325, 341 (1995).
20 Id.  Gaja argues that the extensive interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” “trouve 
surtout sa raison d’être dans l’exigence de répondre à des violations d’obligations essentielles pour 
la société internationale. ... [L]es nouvelles frontières du concept de menace à la paix, telles qu’elles 
ressortent de la pratique du Conseil, ont pour conséquence de restreindre l’admissibilité des réactions 
individuelles” (Giorgio Gaja, Réﬂexions sur le rôle du Conseil de sécurité dans le nouvel ordre
mondial. A propos des rapports entre maintien de la paix et crimes internationaux des Etats, 97 
REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 297, 307, 309 (1993)).
21 DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
178 (2009). 
22 Note by the President of the Security Council at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992).
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regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina.23  The following year, Resolution 955 (1994) 
qualiﬁed violations of international humanitarian law committed in an internal armed
conﬂict (Rwanda) as a threat to international peace and security.24  In Resolution 
1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict, systematic, ﬂagrant and
widespread violations of international humanitarian law were qualiﬁed for the ﬁrst
time as potentially constituting threats to the peace without reference to any speciﬁc
conﬂict.25  The Security Council’s meeting records also show that several States have 
reafﬁrmed the link between the maintenance of international peace and security and
compliance with international humanitarian law.26
The question is, however, whether any violation of international humanitarian law 
can qualify as a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39.  Even though the Security 
Council enjoys a broad discretion in determining the existence of such a threat,27 this 
kompetenz-kompetenz is not unlimited: a threat to the peace could not be “artiﬁcially
created as a pretext for the realization of ulterior purposes.”28  The International 
23 S.C Res 808 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
24 S.C. Res 955 at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  In other resolutions, e.g., Res. 
794 (1992) with regard to Somalia, it is the consequences (“human tragedy”) of the violations of 
international humanitarian law and of the armed violence more than the violations themselves that 
were qualiﬁed as a threat to the peace (S.C. Res 794 at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992)).
25 S.C. Res 1296, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000).  See also S.C Res. 1674, para. 
26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006), S.C. Res 1738, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1738 (Dec. 
23, 2006) and S.C. Res. 1894, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) on the protection of 
civilians in armed conﬂict and Res. 1314 (2000) on children and armed conﬂict, that use identical
language.
26 See, e.g., Egypt (U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4130th mtg. (Resumption 1) at 12, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.4130 (Resumption 1) (Apr. 19, 2000)); Morocco (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6066th mtg. 
(Resumption 1) at 22-23, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), (Jan. 14, 2009)); United Arab 
Emirates (id. at 8); Canada (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6151th mtg. (Resumption 1) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.6151 (Resumption 1) (June 26, 2009)); Croatia (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6216th mtg. at 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.6216 (Nov. 11, 2009)).  An exception appears to be India’s claim that Chapter VII does 
not apply to breaches of international humanitarian law (Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and 
New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 15, 60 (2003)).
27 See the Dissenting Opinion of  Judge Weeramantry in Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v. UK; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. US), Order on Request for the indication of 
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 160, 176 (Apr. 14): “the determination under Article 39 of the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, is one entirely within the 
discretion of the Council.  It would appear that the Council and no other is the judge of the existence 
of the state of affairs that brings Chapter VII into operation.”
28 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, supra note 14, para. 116-17.  The qualiﬁcation as
a threat to the peace of the failure of Libya to extradite the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie 
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) made clear that “the ‘threat to 
the peace’ is more of a political concept.  But the determination that there exists such 
a threat is not a matter of totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very 
least, within the limits of the purposes and principles of the Charter.”29  According to 
Conforti, the conduct of a State cannot be considered a threat to the peace “when the 
condemnation is not shared by the opinion of most of the States and their peoples.”30 
Other commentators refer to the limit of good faith and to the doctrine of abuse of 
right.31  It is true that there is no direct judicial control over acts of the Council,32 but 
there are indirect ones: protest by refusal to comply with the resolution by the UN 
Member States, indirect judicial control when a resolution becomes relevant to decide 
a case before an international or national tribunal, and acceptance of the Security 
Council’s action by the international community.33
In order to establish the existence of a threat to the peace, then, the rank of the 
breached norm or value, the severity of the violation and its transboundary effects 
need be taken into consideration.34  This conclusion is conﬁrmed by the practice of
the Council: Resolutions 808 (1993), 955 (1994), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 
(2006), 1894 (2009) and 1314 (2000) all specify that the violations of international 
humanitarian law amounting to a threat to the peace are “systematic, widespread and 
bombing and to renounce terrorism “by concrete actions,” contained in Res. 748 (1992), has for 
instance been criticised (Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, 
in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 361, 378-79 (Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999)).
29 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case no. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 29 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić]. 
30 BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 177 (2005) (emphasis in 
the original). 
31 See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, 240 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 191 (1993-III); Lamb, supra note 28, at 385.
32 In his Separate Opinion in the Genocide case, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht recalled that the ICJ’s 
power of judicial review “does not embrace any right of the Court to substitute its [own] discretion 
for that of the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression, or the political steps to be taken following such a determination.” 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993 
I.C.J. 407, para. 99 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Genocide case].
33 Michael Bothe, Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de sécurité, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL - WORKSHOP OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 70 
(René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1992). 
34 MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, DIE BEFUGNISSE DES UN-SICHERHEITSRATES: AUFGEKLÄRTER ABSOLUTISMUS 
IM VÖLKERRECHT? 16 (1998). 
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ﬂagrant.”35  It will however be seen that customary international law appears to have 
made this de minimis requirement of scarce practical importance.36
B. ARTICLE 94(2) OF THE UN CHARTER
The competence of the Security Council to secure compliance with the jus in bello 
could also be indirectly founded on another Charter provision.  Article 94(2) confers 
on the Security Council the additional authority to make recommendations or decide 
upon measures with the purpose of giving effect to the judgments of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), including of course those that might establish violations of 
international humanitarian law.37  The Council, however, could act only upon recourse 
of the successful litigant, and not of other UN members.  Furthermore, the Council 
may decline to enforce the judgment, as Article 94(2) provides for action only “if [the 
Council] deems necessary.”38 
As Article 94(2) does not specify what “measures” the Council could adopt 
to enforce an ICJ judgment, one has to conclude that these include, but are not 
limited to,39 those provided in Chapters VI and VII.40  It is to be observed, though, 
that the adoption of Article 41 measures on the basis of Article 94(2) would not be 
subordinated to the conditions spelt out in Article 39, i.e., the previous determination 
of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.41  As to 
measures involving the use of force, it has been suggested that the Council could not 
35 S.C. Res. 808 (supra note 23, at 2) with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the example 
of mass killings and ethnic cleansing.  France, sponsor of the resolution, declared that the violations 
of international humanitarian law in Bosnia were a threat to the peace because their commission 
would inﬂame the conﬂict (U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (Feb.
22, 1993)).  See S.C. Res 955, supra note  24; S.C. Res 1296, supra note 25, para. 5; S.C Res. 1674, 
supra note 25, para. 26; S.C. Res 1738, supra note 25, para. 9; S.C. Res. 1894, supra note 25, para. 
3; S.C. Res. 1314, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Aug. 11, 2000).
36 See infra Section I.D.  
37 See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgement, 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 345 (Dec. 19, 2005).
38 U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 2.
39 Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 21 (1960).
40 Available measures are discussed by Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of 
the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539, 561-63 
(1995). 
41 Hermann Mosler & Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 94, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY Vol. 2, 1174, 1177 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Schachter, supra note 39, 
at 19-20; Tanzi, supra note 40, at 561.
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resort to them to enforce an ICJ judgment in the absence of the preconditions listed in 
Article 39, as ICJ decisions are peaceful means to settle a dispute.42  This conclusion 
cannot be accepted for several reasons.  First, such an interpretation would make 
Article 94(2) largely redundant.  Second, the provision under examination does not 
make any distinction among different Chapter VII measures.  Finally, both sanctions 
and measures involving the use of force share the same rationale, as they are both 
measures taken against a State.43
C. OTHER TREATIES
Certain treaties containing international humanitarian law provisions speciﬁcally
provide a role for the Security Council in their implementation, i.e., the 1977 
Environmental Modiﬁcation Convention44 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention,45 while Article 13(b) of the 1998 Rome Statute confers upon the Council 
the right to refer a situation involving, inter alia, the commission of war crimes to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).46  More vaguely, Article 89 of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that “[i]n situations of 
serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to act jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in 
conformity with the United Nations Charter.”47  While these treaties could not confer 
42 Mosler & Oellers-Frahm, supra note 41, at 1177; Schachter, supra note 39, at 22; T.D. Gill, 
Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its 
Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT’L L.33, 59-60 
(1995). 
43 In any case, given the broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” by the Council, 
the problem seems of limited practical relevance (Tanzi, supra note 40, at 561).
44 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modiﬁcation Techniques, art. V, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151.
45 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. XII (4), Jan. 13th, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), Jul. 17, 2000, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
This right has been exercised for the ﬁrst time with regard to the situation in Darfur (S.C. Res. 1593,
para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005)). 
47 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts (Protocol I), art. 89, June 8th, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  A similar provision is contained in the Second Protocol to the 
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conﬂict,
art 31, Mar. 26th, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172.  According to the Commentary to Article 89, “serious 
violations” of the Conventions or of the Protocol means “conduct contrary to these instruments which 
is of a serious nature but which is not included as such in the list of ‘grave breaches’” (Sandoz, 
Swinarski & Zimmermann, supra note 12, para. 3591).  This call for cooperation in reacting against 
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competences upon the Security Council that it does not already possess under the 
Charter, they would at least prevent States parties from claiming that when the Council 
adopts a resolution that tries to secure compliance with the international humanitarian 
law provisions contained in such instruments, it is acting ultra vires.
D. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN ARTICLE 1 COMMON TO THE 
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
Neither Article 39 nor Article 94(2) of the Charter can found a general competence 
of the Security Council to enforce international humanitarian law, as the former 
only applies to serious and widespread violations amounting to a threat to the peace 
while the latter operates exclusively with regard to violations established in an ICJ 
judgment.  The competence of the Security Council could however ﬁnd a legal basis
on customary international law, as reﬂected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War.48  Indeed, the Charter is a treaty and, 
as such, can be modiﬁed by subsequent custom: informal modiﬁcations of the Charter
were endorsed by the ICJ in the 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia with regard to 
Article 27(3).49  If one admits that customary international law can modify certain 
Charter provisions like those on the UN organs’ voting procedure and powers,50 there 
does not seem to be any reason why such modiﬁcation could not occur with regard to
the provisions ﬁxing the competences of these organs.  This has for instance occurred
at least the most serious violations of international (humanitarian) law is also contained in Article 
41(1) of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly, which 
provides that “States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach” 
of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law (Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 53rd Sess, Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001 at 286 U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001)). The Commentary to the article states that this “[c]ooperation could 
be organized in the framework of a competent international organization, in particular the United 
Nations” (Id. at 287).
48 See infra note 122.
49 Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, at 22, para. 22.  See also Wolfram Karl, Bernd 
Mützelburg & Georg Witschel, Article 108, in Simma, supra note 41, at 1341, 1346, paras. 11-12.
50 See CONFORTI, supra note 30, at 66-67, & 208, who gives the examples of the validity of 
Security Council non-procedural decisions adopted with the abstention of one or more permanent 
members and the delegation of the use of force by the Council to Member States.  Those who see the 
Charter as a “constitution” come to a different conclusion (see, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United 
Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 
586, 600 (1998)).
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with the politicization of the role of the Secretary-General well beyond what provided 
in Articles 97-101 of the Charter.51
Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, “[t]he High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances.”52  It is true that the UN is not a party to the Conventions, but in the 
Nicaragua case the ICJ held that this provision codiﬁes customary international law.53 
The ICTY further clariﬁed that Common Article 1, as a “general principle,” “lays 
down an obligation that is incumbent, not only on States, but also on other international 
entities including the United Nations.”54  Even though it cannot be construed as 
implying an obligation to act, the customary provision reﬂected in Common Article
1 constitutes a legal ground for the Security Council, as the UN organ provided with 
enforcement powers, to exercise such powers in order to ensure compliance with 
international humanitarian law “in all circumstances,” whether or not the violations 
51 Ingo Winkelmann, United Nations Charter, Amendment, para. 17, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrumed.) Online edition http://www.mpepil.com.
52 Emphasis added.  See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 1(1), and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, art. 38(1), Nov. 20 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  A similar provision does 
not appear in Additional Protocol II but it has been argued that, as the situations covered by this 
Protocol also fall within the scope of application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
the obligation to respect and ensure respect applies to non-international armed conﬂicts as well (Luigi
Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des 
Etats de «respecter et faire respecter» le droit international humanitaire «en toutes circonstances,” 
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF 
JEAN PICTET 17, 17 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984)).  It has been demonstrated that the obligation 
to ensure respect contained in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions was initially intended 
by the drafters as referring to internal observance within the states parties to the Conventions (Adam 
Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conﬂicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 11, 29-30 (1995)).  The new, broader interpretation of Article 1, which also addresses 
states not involved in the armed conﬂict, was solemnly supported by the above mentioned Res. 2444
(XXIII) on Human Rights and Armed Conﬂict, adopted by the 1968 International Conference on
Human Rights with no vote against (supra note 11).  This interpretation has also been endorsed by 
the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 199-200, para. 158 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion]: 
“It follows from that provision [Common Article 1] that every State party to that Convention, whether 
or not it is a party to a speciﬁc conﬂict, is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of the 
instruments in question are complied with” (emphasis added).
53 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 220 (June 27).  This is also the ICRC position, see 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 509-13 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).  See also Condorelli & 
Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 52, at 27-29.
54 Tadić, supra note 29, para. 93.  See also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, 
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 67, 70 (2000).
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have a destabilizing effect on international peace and security and whether or not they 
have been established in an ICJ judgment.55  Indeed, as argued by a commentator, the 
Council can act at the same time as an organ of a traditional international organization, 
entrusted by its members to pursue the purposes deﬁned in its Charter and within
the limits contained therein, and as a material organ of the international community 
for the protection of erga omnes obligations under customary international law: The 
exercise of new competences and powers by the Security Council should be seen as 
a manifestation of the latter phenomenon.56  This dédoublement fonctionnel57 seems 
conﬁrmed by paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which
55 It has been observed that “[h]umanitarian principles have value per se and should not be 
considered only when security issues which endanger international peace and security are at stake” 
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Collective Responsibility of States to Ensure Respect for 
Humanitarian Principles, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 247, 255 (Arie Bloed, Liselotte 
Leicht, Manfred Nowak and Allan Rosas eds., 1993)).  Common Article 1 does not however, impose 
on the Council an obligation to act.  Indeed, it has been suggested that state practice shows that 
“Article 1 allows third states to intervene, but does not oblige them to do so” (ROBERT KOLB & 
RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 288 (2008)).  The 
ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law appears to share this view: Rule 144 
vaguely provides that states “must exert their inﬂuence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of
international humanitarian law” (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53, at 509).  According 
to Kalshoven, “the primary legal obligation arising from common Article 1 is for States Parties to 
impose respect for the applicable rules of international humanitarian law, ‘in all circumstances’, on 
their armed forces, including armed groups under their control, and on their populations,” as only for 
this obligation can states be held legally responsible, while when it comes to respect by their peers, 
States are only under a moral incentive or obligation (Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect 
and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. 
L. 3, 60 (1999)).  See similarly the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans in the Wall Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 52, at 232-34, paras. 46-50.  The existence of a positive duty to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law “at the very least by third parties controlled by that state” is claimed 
by THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 31 (1989). See 
generally id. at 30-31.
56 Such use of the UN would be contemplated in an emerging norm of customary international 
law (PAOLO PICONE, COMUNITÀ INTERNAZIONALE E OBBLIGHI «ERGA OMNES» especially 215-18, 273-74, 
306-08, 332 (2006)).  Another commentator has also emphasized that “[t]he existence of community 
organs allows us to speak of an organized entity possessing a right, and the actual ability, to demand 
the performance of obligations erga omnes” (Fassbender, supra note 50, at 592) (emphasis added). 
See also the words of the Libyan representative during the debate on the protection of civilians in 
armed conﬂict: “The international community, represented mainly by this Council, not only has the 
right to take measures but has the responsibility to act if the parties directly concerned have not 
managed to protect civilians or have shown a lack of will to do so” (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6151st 
mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6151 (June 26, 2009)) (emphasis added).
57 For the notion of dédoublement fonctionnel, see GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS: 
PRINCIPES ET SYSTÉMATIQUE vol. II 10-12 (1934).
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invokes the notion of the “responsibility to protect” and declares that the international 
community is
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant international organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from … war crimes….58 
As can be seen, the paragraph does not expressly link the exercise of such 
responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security.  Although not 
binding, the document is important, as it reﬂects the consensus reached at the largest
gathering of heads of State and government in history.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
THROUGH CHAPTER VII MEASURES
The Security Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to international 
humanitarian law.  It has for instance determined that international humanitarian 
law applies to certain situations59 or that certain conduct amounts to a violation of 
international humanitarian law,60 it has invited to consider to convene a meeting of 
58 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome Document].  On the “responsibility to protect” see Marco 
Roscini, Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum, 69 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 931, 948-55 (2009), and the bibliography 
cited therein.
59 See the reafﬁrmation of the de jure applicability of the IV Geneva Convention to the territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967.  The ﬁrst express reference in this regard is contained in S.C. Res.
271, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/271 (Sept. 15, 1969), although the Council had already implicitly 
recognized this in Res. 237, supra note 3, para. 2.  See also S.C. Res. 469, U.N. Doc. S/RES/469 
(May 20, 1980), S.C. Res. 471, U.N. Doc. S/RES/471 (June 5, 1980), S.C. Res 607, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/607 (Jan. 5, 1988) and S.C. Res. 636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/636 (July 6, 1989), which reafﬁrm
the applicability of arts. 1, 27, 47 and 49 of the IV Geneva Convention to the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories, respectively.  The Council has also urged Israel to recognize the de jure application of 
the IV Geneva Convention (S.C. Res. 681, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (Dec. 20, 1990)).  These 
calls have however proved not to be very effective, although they might have been one of the factors 
bringing Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table (Michael Bothe, The United Nations 
Actions for the Respect of International Humanitarian Law and the Coordination of Related 
International Operations, in Condorelli, La Rosa & Scherrer, supra note 7, at 213, 220).
60 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 819, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993) on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, that qualiﬁes impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance as a serious violation of
international humanitarian law.
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the High Contracting Parties to the IV Geneva Convention61 and it has condemned or 
deplored violations and those who perpetrated them.62  The Council has also set up 
fact-ﬁnding bodies (albeit that these have sometimes been preliminary to the adoption
of coercive measures).63  This exercise of a fact-ﬁnding function by the Council has
at least partly remedied the paralysis of the International Fact-Finding Commission 
envisaged in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I, although it has also been noted that 
this practice of establishing ad hoc bodies is one of the factors that have condemned 
the Commission to inactivity.64
61 S.C. Res. 681, supra note 59, para. 6, with regard to the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
62 The ﬁrst time a state was censored for breaching international humanitarian law was in S.C.
Res. 446, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979), which strongly deplored the establishment 
of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian and Arab territories.  For condemnations of violations of 
international humanitarian law in general, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/540 (Oct. 31, 
1983) with regard to the Iran-Iraq conﬂict; S.C. Res. 876, U.N. Doc. S/RES/876 (Oct. 19, 1993) with
regard to Abkhazia; S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004), S.C. Res. 1711, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1711 (Sept. 29, 2006) and S.C. Res. 1736, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1736 (Dec. 22, 2006) with 
regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); S.C. Res. 1865, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1865 (Jan. 
27, 2009) with regard to Côte d’Ivoire; and S.C. Res. 1881, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1881 (July 30, 2009) 
with regard to Darfur.  See also the presidential statement adopted in January 2009 condemning 
all violations of international humanitarian law and demanding that all relevant parties cease those 
violations (S.C. Pres. Statement 2009/1 at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2009/1 (Jan. 14, 2009)).  For 
condemnations of certain speciﬁc conduct or provisions, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1231, para. 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1231 (Mar. 11, 1999) with regard to attacks on civilians and the recruitment of child soldiers 
in Sierra Leone; S.C. Res. 771, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (Aug. 13, 1992) with regard to ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia; S.C. Res. 864 para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993) 
with regard to attacks on UN personnel in Angola; and S.C. Res. 1925 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1925 
(May 28, 2010) with regard to targeted attacks against the civilian population, widespread sexual 
violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers and extrajudicial executions in the DRC.
63 One may recall, in this regard, the creation of the Commissions of Experts for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and of an Inquiry Commission for Darfur (S.C. Res. 780, para. 2, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992), S.C. 935, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994) and S.C. 
Res. 1564, para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004), respectively).  If the inﬂuence of
the reports by the Commissions of Experts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is debatable, 
the Security Council seems to have followed the indications of the Darfur Commission, which 
recommended referral of the situation to the ICC (Robert Cryer, The Security Council and 
International Humanitarian Law, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 245, 262-63 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006)).  The Security Council 
has also requested the UN Secretary-General, special representatives, States, non-governmental 
organizations and peacekeeping forces to collect information (e.g., S.C. Res. 918 at 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994); S.C. Res. 674, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (Oct. 29, 1990); S.C. 
Res. 771, supra note 62, para. 5; S.C. Res. 1865, supra note 62, para. 25; S.C. Res. 1893, para. 12, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1893 (Oct. 29, 2009); S.C. Res. 1925, supra note 62, para.17; S.C. Res. 1933, 
para. 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1933 (June 30, 2010)). 
64 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, para. 90.  See also the words of the Swiss 
representative in the Security Council, S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 6 (“Switzerland 
recalls the existence of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission established by the 
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  We encourage the Security Council to give 
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Although the importance of the above declaratory and fact-ﬁnding measures cannot
be underestimated, this article will focus on the enforcement measures provided in 
Chapter VII aimed at forcing compliance by actors breaching the jus in bello.  First, 
the Security Council has in various  armed conﬂicts encouraged, urged, called on,
demanded and requested belligerent States to comply with international humanitarian 
law (in general or with regard to speciﬁc instruments).65  These calls could be adopted 
under Chapter VI but also under Chapter VII.66  In Resolution 1265 (1999) on the 
protection of civilians in armed conﬂict, for the ﬁrst time the Council urged all States
to respect international humanitarian law without reference to a speciﬁc conﬂict.67  In 
some cases, the calls have been accompanied by the threat of the adoption of coercive 
measures in case of non-compliance: it has however been observed that these threats 
usually have a negligible effect on the conduct of those to whom they are addressed.68 
The Council has also on various occasions demanded that the belligerents take certain 
actions, e.g. prevent violations,69 guarantee humanitarian access to the population,70 
protect civilians,71 provide compensation72 and prosecute those responsible for the 
a mandate to that permanent commission rather than appointing ad hoc commissions of inquiry”). 
In S.C. Res. 1265, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999) and S.C. Res. 1894, supra note 
25, para. 9, however, the Council recalled the possibility of using the International Fact-Finding 
Commission.
65 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 814, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) and S.C. Res. 1863, 
para. 3, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1863 (Jan. 16, 2009) with regard to Somalia, S.C. Res. 876, supra note 
62, para. 4, with regard to Abkhazia, S.C. Res. 1881, supra note 62, para. 7 and S.C. Res. 1919 at 
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1919 (Apr. 29, 2010) with regard to Sudan, S.C. Res. 1868 at 3. U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1868 (Mar. 23, 2009); S.C. Res. 1890 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1890 (Oct. 8, 2009) and S.C. Res. 
1917 at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1917 (Mar. 22, 2010) with regard to Afghanistan.
66 In order to establish whether a resolution has been adopted under Chapter VII in the absence 
of an express reference, one should look, for instance, at whether the resolution also simultaneously 
adopts measures under Articles 40, 41 or 42, or whether it expressly qualiﬁes the situation as a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, or whether it refers to a crisis involving the use 
of armed force. See CONFORTI, supra note 30, at 180.
67 S.C. Res. 1265, supra note 64, para. 4.
68 COMELLAS AGUIRREZÁBAL, supra note 6, at 113.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1564, supra note 63, para. 1, 
with regard to Sudan and S.C. Res. 1893, supra note 63, at 1 with regard to Côte d’Ivoire.
69  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1493, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003) with regard to the 
DRC and S.C. Res. 1556 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556  (July 30, 2004) with regard to Sudan.
70 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 819, supra note 60, para. 8, with regard to the former Yugoslavia, S.C. 
Res. 1744, para. 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (Feb. 21, 2007) and S.C. Res. 1910, para. 17, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1910 (Jan. 28, 2010) with regard to Somalia, and S.C. Res. 1923, para. 22, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1923 (May 25, 2010) on Chad and the Central African Republic.
71 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1592, at 2, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005) with regard to 
the DRC and S.C. Res. 1863, supra note 65, para. 19, with regard to Somalia.
72 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 471, supra note 59, para. 3, with regard to the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories.
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violations.73  Again, these calls can range from mere recommendations to decisions 
adopted under Chapter VII.  In some cases, the Council has even called upon States 
not involved in a given conﬂict to adopt certain measures, as in the case of the
resolutions calling upon third States not to provide assistance to Israel in connection 
with settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.74
The most incisive measures at the disposal of the Security Council are however 
those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII.75  As to the former, most of the 
sanctions regimes established after 1997 have had the purpose of limiting violence 
that had an impact on civilians.76  In particular, at least four of the sanctions regimes 
created after 2004 (Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
and Somalia) are related to violations of human rights or international humanitarian 
law.77  The problem with full-scale sanctions is that they may at the same time enforce 
international humanitarian law and have severe negative effects on civilians and 
vulnerable groups.78  Two solutions have been engineered to solve this problem.  The 
ﬁrst is the inclusion of a humanitarian exception in the sanctions regime, in order to
allow the provision of goods essential for the survival of the civilian population.79 
73 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1653, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1653 (Jan. 27, 2006) with regard to the 
African Great Lakes.  S.C. Res. 1012 at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1012 (Aug. 28, 1995), requesting the 
Secretary-General to set up an international commission of inquiry on Burundi, recalls that “impunity 
… leads to violations of international humanitarian law.”
74 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 465, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980) and 471, supra note 59, 
para. 5, with regard to the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
75 It is worth recalling that the limit of domestic jurisdiction does not prejudice the application of 
Chapter VII enforcement measures (U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7).
76 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 9 (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
XCuttingPOC2008.pdf [hereinafter SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT].  Economic sanctions have been 
deﬁned as “measures not including the use of military force and taken individually or collectively by
States to put pressure on an individual State (the targeted or embargoed State), with a view to inducing 
the authorities of that State to adopt a speciﬁed course of action” (Hans-Peter Gasser, Collective 
Economic Sanctions and International Humanitarian Law, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 871, 876 (1996) (footnote omitted)).
77 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 76, at 9.  See S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 
(Nov. 20, 2008) on Somalia, as well as S.C. Res. 1907, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1907 (Dec. 23, 2009) with 
regard to Eritrea.
78 In his 1995 “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace,” the UN Secretary-General famously 
described sanctions as a “blunt instrument” that inﬂicts suffering on the vulnerable groups in the
target country and which has “unintended or unwanted effects” (U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement 
to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 70, U.N. Doc. A/50/60–S/1995/1 (Jan. 25, 1995)).
79 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 757, para. 4(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992) that excludes 
foodstuffs and medical supplies from the embargo against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  See 
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The second and now most popular solution is to replace indiscriminate measures with 
“smart” or “targeted” sanctions in certain cases accompanied by the authorization to 
use all necessary means to ensure their respect.80  The sanctions regimes with regard 
to Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and DRC, for instance, provide for 
measures speciﬁcally targeting individuals and entities responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law (including non-State actors), e.g. arms embargoes, 
bans on the export of natural resources aimed to ﬁnance conﬂicts, the freezing of
ﬁnancial assets and restrictions on ﬂights and movement.81  Their efﬁcacy, which
depends on their implementation by Member States, is however doubtful.82  Another 
problem lies in the fact that targeted measures on individuals might amount to the 
imposition of penalties without due process guarantees: indeed, decisions on listing 
and de-listing targeted individuals and entities are taken by political organs (the 
sanctions committees) that do not disclose the reasons for their decisions, the listees 
are not represented in the procedure and no judicial review against the decisions is 
provided.83  It is therefore not surprising that the World Summit Outcome Document 
also S.C. Res. 661, para. 3(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990), S.C. Res. 666, para. 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/666 (Sept. 13,1990) and S.C. Res. 986, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995) 
with regard to Iraq, S.C. Res. 1127, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (Aug. 28, 1997) with regard to 
UNITA in Angola, S.C. Res. 1591, para. 3(g), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) with regard to 
Sudan and S.C. Res. 1596, para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1596 (May 3, 2005) with regard to the DRC.
80 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 787, paras. 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992) with regard to 
Yugoslavia and S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) with regard to Sierra Leone.
81 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1478 (May 6, 2003) and S.C. Res. 1521, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1521 (Dec. 22, 2003) in relation to Liberia; S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 69, S.C. Res. 1596, 
supra note 79, and S.C. Res. 1807, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1807 (Mar. 31, 2008) in relation to the DRC; 
S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 69, and S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 79, in relation to Sudan; S.C. Res. 
1572, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004) in relation to Côte d’Ivoire; S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000) in relation to Sierra Leone.
82 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 76, at 27.  In a recent debate on the protection of 
civilians in armed conﬂict, China declared itself “not in favour of the Council resorting to the use
of or threatening the use of sanctions at every turn” (S/PV.6151, supra note 56, at 13).  On whether 
economic sanctions are an adequate response to violations of international humanitarian law, see 
Bourloyannis, who argues that in cases of use of prohibited weapons or indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians an arms embargo seems appropriate, but if it is directed at all parties to the conﬂict it would
disadvantage those belligerents that comply with international humanitarian law.  On the other hand, 
an arms embargo only targeting those who breach international humanitarian law might alter the 
military balance between the parties.  In case of violations of the law of occupation, a comprehensive 
economic embargo does not seem appropriate, as it would increase the suffering of the population 
living in the occupied territory and in the target state (Bourloyannis, supra note 5, at 354-55).
83 Challenges against targeted sanctions listings have been brought before different fora, most 
famously before the European Court of Justice. See Enzo Cannizzaro, A Machiavellian Moment? 
The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law, 3 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 189 (2006); Pasquale De Sena 
& Maria Chiara Vitucci, The European Courts and the Security Council: Between Dédoublement 
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reafﬁrmed the need for fair and clear procedures for placing individuals and entities
on sanctions lists and for removing them.84  The 2006 Watson Report made a number 
of recommendations for reform with regard to the processes of notiﬁcation, access,
fair hearing and effective remedy.85  Some of these procedural safeguards to protect 
individual rights were eventually adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 1730 
(2006), by which the Council requested the UN Secretary-General to establish within 
the Secretariat a “focal point” to receive de-listing requests and perform the tasks 
described in the annex to the resolution.86
The Security Council has also adopted other measures that can be ascribed to 
Article 41 but are not expressly mentioned therein.  The most famous examples are 
the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda in order to investigate and prosecute those responsible for grave 
violations of international humanitarian law87 and the creation of the UN Compensation 
Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 193 (2009); Andrea Gattini, Joined Cases 
C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council 
and Commission, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3 September 2008, nyr., 46 COMM. MKT. L. 
REV. 213 (2009); Christopher Michaelsen, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities: The Incompatibility of the United Nations Security 
Council’s 1267 Sanctions Regime with European Due Process Guarantees, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 329 
(2009); Gabriele Porretto, The European Union, Counter-Terrorism Sanctions against Individuals 
and Human Rights Protection, in FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 235 (Miriam Gani & 
Penelope Mathew eds., 2008).
84 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 58, para. 109.
85 WATSON INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND 
CLEAR PROCEDURES (2006) available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_
Sanctions.pdf.  The Report subsequently became both a General Assembly and Security Council 
ofﬁcial document (Identical Letters dated May 19, 2006 from the Permanent Representatives of
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/60/887–S/2006/331 (June 14, 
2006)) and was updated in 2009 (THOMAS BIERSTEKER ET. AL., ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO TARGETED 
SANCTIONS: AN UPDATE OF THE “WATSON REPORT” (2009), http://watsoninstitute.org/images_news/
FB09_sanctionsreport.pdf (hereinafter Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions)).
86 S.C. Res. 1730, para. 1, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).  See Addressing Challenges 
to Targeted Sanctions, supra note 85, at 12-14.  Further guarantees, including the introduction of an 
independent and impartial ombudsperson to look into requests for delisting targeted individuals and 
entities, have subsequently been introduced by the Council, but only with regard to the sanctions 
regimes against international terrorism and not in relation to other sanctions (S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009)).
87 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) and Res. 955, supra note 24, respectively. 
According to Meron:
[t]he singling out of violations of humanitarian law as a major factor in the determination of 
a threat to the peace creates an important precedent, and the establishment of the tribunal as 
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Commission for Iraq.88  Furthermore, by Resolution 1593 (2005), acting under Chapter 
VII the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.89  The ICTY and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have both held that the Council 
had not exceeded its powers when it created judicial organs to prosecute jus in bello 
violations.90  According to the ICTY, in particular, the legality of the tribunals does 
not depend on the question whether these measures have been actually successful in 
securing compliance with international humanitarian law.91
As to measures involving the use of force, if States and regional organizations are 
not entitled to unilaterally use military coercion in order to secure compliance with the 
jus in bello as neither Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions nor Article 89 
of Additional Protocol I constitute exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,92 the 
an enforcement measure under the binding authority of chapter VII … may foreshadow more 
effective international responses to violations of humanitarian law.
Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 78, 79 (1994) (citation omitted).
88 S.C. Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991).  It has been noted that “[c]laims for 
compensation of violations of humanitarian principles can clearly be brought before the Commission 
….” (Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 55, at 253).  In fact, even if Iraq’s responsibility arises 
from a violation of jus ad bellum and not of other international law (including jus in bello), the 
Commission has played a function in the reparation of violations of international humanitarian 
law in case of state responsibility.  The creation of a similar compensation commission has been 
recommended by the Inquiry Commission for Darfur (U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 1, 
2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, paras. 590-603, 
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60, (Feb. 1, 2005)).
89 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
90 Tadić, supra note 29, paras. 32 ff. (which conﬁrmed the view of the Trial Chamber on the
point), Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction in the 
Trial Chamber, paras. 25-31 (Aug. 10, 1995); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, 
Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, paras. 17 ff (June 18, 1997).  Both courts concluded 
that the creation of the international criminal tribunals could be seen as a measure adopted under 
Article 41 of the UN Charter.  See, contra, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security Council’s «Law-
Making,” 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 609, 724 (2000); and Picone, who sees the creation 
of the ICTY as the exercise of new powers by the Security Council and as a sanction adopted by 
the organ in reaction to the violations of erga omnes obligations committed by the belligerents in 
Yugoslavia (supra note 56, at 353-75, especially at 358).
91 According to the ICTY “[i]t would be a total misconception of what are the criteria of legality 
and validity in law to test the legality of such measures ex post facto by their success or failure to 
achieve their ends” (Tadić, supra note 29, para. 39).  On the role played by the ad hoc tribunals in 
the judicial enforcement of international humanitarian law, see Fausto Pocar, Criminal Proceedings 
before the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 5 LAW & 
PRACTICE OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 89 (2006). 
92 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Protection of War Victims, 33 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 391, 427-28 (1993) (“international humanitarian law could not possibly provide a 
State not involved in the conﬂict with a pretext for intervening militarily or for deploying forceful
measures outside the framework provided for by the United Nations Charter”); Commentaries on 
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Security Council could take or authorize military action under Chapter VII in order to 
prevent or stop violations of international humanitarian law.93  From this perspective, 
it has been claimed that there is “an evident trend towards militarization in the 
implementation of international humanitarian law.”94  In 1996, the ICTY amended 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence and adopted Article 59 bis, which authorizes the 
arrest of ICTY indictees by international forces in the ﬁeld when necessary to ensure
the effective functioning of the Tribunal.95  The Security Council has also repeatedly 
authorized UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces, state coalitions and 
regional organizations to use force if necessary to protect civilians and guarantee 
humanitarian access:  The Council referred for the ﬁrst time to the “protection [of]
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” and authorized a peacekeeping 
force to take “necessary action” to ensure such protection in Resolution 1270 (1999) 
establishing the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).96  Although the language 
is not always consistent (apart from “necessary action,” peacekeeping forces have 
Article 1(1) and Article 89 of Additional Protocol I, in Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann, supra 
note 12, paras. 46, 3598; Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53, at 512-13.  See also the 
Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 52, para. 159.
93 Commentary on Article 89 of Additional Protocol I, in Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann, 
supra note 12, para. 3597.  The above mentioned World Summit Outcome Document makes it clear 
that the international community can take collective action against, inter alia, the commission of 
war crimes only “through the Security Council” (World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 
58, para. 139).  In the thematic debate on the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict, the Russian
representative in the Security Council stated that “[t]he international community can only take 
appropriate steps, especially when it comes to the use of force, under the auspices and with the 
consent of the Security Council, as well as in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” 
(S/PV.6216, supra note 26, at 16).
94 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, supra note 54, at 82.
95 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (as further amended 18 January 1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7 (Jan. 
18, 1996).  Arrests of several war criminals have as a consequence been executed by UN forces in 
the former Yugoslavia.  This rule-making power of the Tribunal with regard to arrests is not without 
problems and was challenged before the Tribunal itself: see Lamb, supra note 28, at 379-84. 
96 S.C. Res. 1270, para. 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999); VICTORIA HOLT, GLYN TAYLOR 
& MAX KELLY, PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, INDEPENDENT 
STUDY JOINTLY COMMISSIONED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO) AND THE OFFICE 
FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA) 36-37 (2009) [hereinafter DPKO/OCHA 
Study].  However, as the Study has demonstrated, what the Security Council means by “protecting 
civilians from imminent threat” is not always clear or consistent (id. at 75-77).  From the most recent 
document, it appears that the UN is moving towards a broader notion of  protection of civilians 
which goes beyond physical protection (DPKO/DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, A NEW PARTNERSHIP 
AGENDA: CHARTING A NEW HORIZON FOR UN PEACEKEEPING 20 (2009) [hereinafter A NEW PARTNERSHIP 
AGENDA]).
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also been authorized to use “all necessary means” or “all necessary measures” to 
implement their mandate), the inclusion of a protection mandate based on Chapter VII 
is now virtually standard in UN peace operations.97
The inclusion of protection activities in the mandate of UN forces, as reafﬁrmed in
Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009),98 is one of the most important developments 
in the ﬁeld of peacekeeping in recent years.  In fact, one of the results of the Security
Council public thematic debate on the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict has been
the establishment, in January 2009, of an informal Expert Group on the Protection of 
Civilians to receive and consider brieﬁngs from the Secretariat prior to consultations
on the mandates of speciﬁc peacekeeping operations.99  The Group meets when a 
97 See, e.g., the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), now renamed UN Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S.C. Res. 1291, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000); S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 69, para. 25; S.C. Res. 1856, para. 5, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1906, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1906 (Dec. 23, 2009); 
S.C. Res.1925, supra note 62, para. 11), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (S.C. Res. 1590, para. 
16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) and S.C. Res. 1706, para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 
(Aug. 31, 2006)), the AU-UN Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (S.C. Res. 1769, para. 15, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) that does not refer to the fact that civilians must be “under imminent 
threat of physical violence”), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (S.C. Res. 1701, para. 
12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006)), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and 
Chad (MINURCAT) (S.C. Res. 1861, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1861 (Jan. 14, 2009) and S.C. Res. 
1923, supra note 70, para. 8) and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) (S.C. Res. 1528, para. 
8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004), S.C. Res. 1609, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1609 (June 
24, 2005), S.C. Res. 1739, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1739 (Jan. 10, 2007), S.C. Res. 1933, supra 
note 63, para. 16(b)).  The Council has also authorized the EU operation in Chad and in the Central 
African Republic to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in danger (in particular refugees 
and displaced persons) and humanitarian personnel and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid 
(S.C. Res. 1778, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25, 2007)).  See also S.C. Res. 1671, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1671 (Apr. 25, 2006) authorizing the deployment of EUFOR R.D. Congo in the DRC 
and S.C. Res. 1528, supra, para. 16, authorizing the French forces to use all necessary means to 
support UNOCI.
98 S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 25, para. 16 and S.C. Res. 1894, supra note 25, para. 19.
99 The debate on the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict ﬁrst took place on February 12 and
22, 1999 and occurs twice a year.  It has led to the adoption of ﬁve thematic resolutions on this topic
(S.C. Res. 1265, supra note 64 and S.C. Resolutions 1296, 1674, 1738, and 1894, supra note 25) and 
to several presidential statements (the ﬁrst being S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/6, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/
1999/6 (Feb. 12, 1999)).  Other thematic Security Council debates involve the protection of women 
and children in armed conﬂict and sexual violence in situations of armed conﬂict. As observed by
Costa Rica, these debates “must be an instrument to guide and to facilitate speciﬁc decision-making”
(U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6066th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6066 (Jan. 14, 2009)).  It should also be 
recalled that, on January 29, 2009, the Council held a private meeting on the subject “Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security: Respect for International Humanitarian Law” under the auspices of 
the French Presidency, in order to identify measures that the Council could adopt to more effectively 
prevent and stop violations of international humanitarian law: this was the ﬁrst time that respect for
international humanitarian law was addressed as a separate issue.  However, it is unclear whether 
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peacekeeping mandate with a protection element needs be renewed.100  Obviously, 
this broader peacekeeping mandate requires that peacekeepers be provided with all 
necessary resources to implement it: This does not seem to have been the case of 
UNAMID (African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur) which has made very little 
progress because of insufﬁcient troops and assets and because of limited cooperation
from Sudan.101  As observed by the representative of Japan, “a substantial gap exists 
between the high expectations placed on a mission to carry out the mandate when 
the Security Council takes a decision and the actual implementation on the ground 
of those mandates.”102  It is therefore not surprising that the two recently published 
studies of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations try to address the operational 
challenges faced by UN operations in the implementation of robust mandates involving 
the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict.103
It is worth recalling that Article 42 provides that it is only when Article 41 measures 
have proven, or are assumed, to be inadequate that measures involving the use of force 
can be taken, and only “as may be necessary.”104  Therefore, even though “Article 39 
there will be a follow-up (see SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (2009) available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%2027%20January%202009_IHL.pdf).
100 The ﬁrst meeting took place in January 2009 on the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte
d’Ivoire.  China has so far not participated in the works of the Group.  The representative of Viet 
Nam observed that “the establishment of any new mechanism within the Security Council must 
be thoroughly studied before a decision is made in order to avoid operational and institutional 
duplication, as well as ﬁnancial implications” (S/PV.6151, supra note 56 at 9).  In January 2009, 
the Security Council also adopted an Aide Memoire, ﬁrst developed in March 2002 at the Council’s
request (S.C. Pres. Statement 2002/6, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/6 (Mar. 15, 2002)) and revised in 
2003 (S.C. Pres. Statement 2003/27, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2003/27, Annex (Dec. 15, 2003)), in order 
to facilitate its consideration of the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict.  Based on the
Council’s practice, the aide-memoire identiﬁes measures that the Council should adopt to respond to
protection concerns, including targeted sanctions against the perpetrators of violations (id. at 12) and 
the referral of situations to the ICC.
101 Security Council Report, supra note 76, at 18.  MONUC also received similar criticism 
(CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 318 (3d ed. 2008)).  The DPKO/OCHA 
Independent Study analyzes how certain peacekeeping operations (UNMIS, UNAMID, UNOCI and 
MONUC) have implemented protection of civilians mandates in the ﬁeld (DPKO/OCHA Study,
supra note 96, at 156-207).
102 S/PV.6151, supra note 56, at 12.  See DPKO “Capstone Doctrine,” that reafﬁrms the necessity
of a “clear and achievable mandate” (DPKO AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (“Capstone Doctrine”) 51 (2008), http://pbpu.
unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf).
103 A New Partnership Agenda, supra note 96; DPKO/OCHA Study, supra note 96.
104 U.N. Charter, art. 42.  The Council does not however have a procedural obligation to adopt 
sanctions ﬁrst, as it could consider that they are inadequate in the light of the circumstances without
actually trying them.
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leaves the choice of means and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys 
wide discretionary powers in this regard; and it could not have been otherwise, as such 
a choice involves political evaluation of highly complex and dynamic situations,”105 
this discretion is not unlimited, both from the perspective of the Charter and of the 
“general system of law in which all international legal persons operate.”106  This 
means that the Security Council should not resort to coercive measures if the situation 
can be effectively dealt with through other means: minor or isolated violations of 
international humanitarian law could for instance be addressed through its peaceful 
settlement powers under Chapter VI.  If adopted, coercive measures will have to be 
proportionate to the violation they react against, as “the Security Council, like other 
international legal persons, would be governed by the requirement that all use of force 
must be proportionate to its aim.”107  As a consequence, only the most serious and 
widespread breaches of the jus in bello would justify the adoption of military measures 
by the Council: indeed, “[m]ilitary enforcement action is a blunt instrument … [which] 
is unlikely of achieving results unless it is employed highly selectively.”108
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW ENFORCER: DOES IT REALLY WORK?
In spite of its broad powers, the role the Security Council has in fact played in the 
enforcement of international humanitarian law can be criticized from several points of 
view.  First, the Council has acted in a selective and opportunistic manner. It has dealt 
with certain conﬂicts, but in others it has kept a very low proﬁle or has not adopted
any measure at all: divisions within the Council or lack of political interest have often 
constrained action.109  Furthermore, the Council has tried to enforce certain jus in bello 
105 Tadić, supra note 29, para. 39.
106 Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 285, 307 (1996).  See also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement 
Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 90 (1994).
107 Gardam, supra note 106, at 307.  See also Bothe, supra note 33, at 78-79.
108 Gill, supra note 42, at 132.
109 See Bothe, supra note 33, at 227.  As observed by Australia in a recent debate on the protection 
of civilians, “there is clearly a need for greater consistency in the Council’s approach.  Too often still, 
the Council appears unwilling to address the plight of civilians in many internal armed conﬂicts,
notwithstanding the obvious destabilizing effects and regional consequences of such conﬂicts.  In
failing to do so, the Council falls short of its obligations under the Charter.”  Even though the Council 
has effective tools at its disposal, “[w]hat is lacking, at times, ... is the political resolve of the Council 
to use those tools to protect civilians and of the broader membership to support such Council action” 
(S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 13).  The Croatian representative also made clear that 
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provisions and instruments but not others,110 has condemned the violations committed 
by only one belligerent (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan),111 has adopted coercive 
measures in certain cases but milder measures in other comparable circumstances 
without this being justiﬁed by the situation on the ground.112  In the end, this “ad 
hoc-ism”113 must be ascribed to the fact that the Council is a political organ, which 
the Charter does not require to be consistent or impartial.  In practice, this means that 
the Council acts only when it is in the interest of its members: no obligation to take 
action exists, not even in the case of massive violations of international humanitarian 
law amounting to a threat to the peace.114  As has been observed, to establish such 
obligation “the UN Charter would have to be rewritten, and even then it would be 
difﬁcult in practice to force the Security Council to live up to its presumed obligation
to intervene.”115  This selective and opportunistic approach of the Security Council 
with regard to, inter alia, the enforcement of international humanitarian law could 
in the end affect its legitimacy: even though “[n]o system of collective security can 
be realistically expected to respond to every transgression of the prevailing order or 
effectively respond to every breach of the public peace[,] … [it must nonetheless] 
show a reasonable degree of coherence, consistency and effectiveness.”116
the Council needs to have “a more consistent approach at the country-speciﬁc level” and that “we
must abandon selective approaches to violations of international humanitarian law” (S/PV.6066, supra 
note 99, at 19-20).  See also the statements of Nicaragua (S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, 
at 16) and Pakistan (S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 36), which highlight the inequity in 
the international response to gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
110 The Security Council has mainly focused on the respect for the Geneva Law more than for the 
Hague Law (Cryer, supra note 63, at 274).
111 In another case, S.C. Res. 1603, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1603 (June 3, 2005), where the Council 
dealt with allegations of sexual offences committed by UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire, it “slipped 
into euphemism” and qualiﬁed those actions as “misconduct” and afﬁrmed that the troops “should
limit their behaviour,” even though it had condemned violations of international humanitarian law by 
all the parties to the conﬂict in previous resolutions (Cryer, supra note 63, at 261).
112 COMELLAS AGUIRREZÁBAL, supra note 6, at 195-96.  S.C. Res. 1860, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 
(Jan. 8, 2009) on Gaza, for instance, does not mention the importance of respect for international 
humanitarian law, which led Switzerland to regret that references to the jus in bello, and to the 
Geneva Conventions in particular, “have become the object of political negotiation and discretion” 
(S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 2).
113 Andrea Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 263 (2002).
114 See World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 58, para. 139 that afﬁrms collective action
through the Security Council under Chapter VII in reaction to the commission of war crimes will be 
taken “on a case-by-case basis.”  Such an obligation does not exist even when the Council acts under 
the customary provision reﬂected in Article 1 Common to the Geneva Conventions: see supra note 55.
115 Inger Österdahl, The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human Rights by the 
UN Security Council, 10 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 1, 14 (2005). 
116 Gill, supra note 42, at 129.
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Second, the ICRC has emphasized that the measures adopted by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII “cannot be considered neutral within the meaning of 
international humanitarian law, even though their ultimate objective may in some cases 
include the aim of putting an end to violations of that law.”117  In this regard, the ICRC 
has recommended clearly distinguishing between actions aimed at the maintenance 
and restoration of international peace and security and actions taken to facilitate the 
application of international humanitarian law, on the basis that the latter is founded on 
the belligerents’ consent, while the former does not exclude coercion.118
Finally, in certain cases the Security Council, far from securing compliance with 
international humanitarian law, has actually interfered with its application.  In 2003, 
the Council adopted Resolution 1497, authorizing the establishment of a multinational 
force in Liberia in order to support the peace process in that country.119  Paragraph 
7 of the resolution provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing states 
which are not parties to the ICC Statute over current or former ofﬁcials or personnel
for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to the multinational force or 
United Nations stabilization force in Liberia, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has 
been expressly waived by the contributing state.  A similar paragraph was included 
in Resolution 1593 (2005) on Sudan by which the Security Council decided to 
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor.120  Neither Resolution 1497 nor 
Resolution 1593 provide for the obligation of a contributing State which is not a party 
to the Rome Statute to exercise its jurisdiction over the individuals in question: the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing State might thus result in impunity.121  It may 
be claimed that the above mentioned resolutions, insofar as they also relate to grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, cannot be easily reconciled with Article 49 of 
the I Geneva Convention, Article 50 of the II Geneva Convention, Article 129 of the 
III Geneva Convention and Article 146 of the IV Geneva Convention, that provide 
117 Report on the Protection of War Victims, supra note 92, at 428 (emphasis omitted).  See also 
Toni Pfanner, Le rôle du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge dans la mise en œuvre du droit 
international humanitaire, in EUR. COMM’N, LAW IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES vol. I, 177, 224 (1995); 
van Baarda, supra note 2, at 146-48.  Condorelli refers to the inevitability of the “amalgame action 
humanitaire-sanction ... lorsque la première est imposée au sens du Chapitre VII” (Luigi Condorelli, 
Conclusions générales, in Condorelli, La Rosa & Scherrer, supra note 7, at 463). 
118 Report on the Protection of War Victims, supra note 92, at 429.
119 S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
120 S.C. Res. 1593, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
121 Giorgio Gaja, Immunità squilibrate dalla giurisdizione penale in relazione all’intervento 
armato in Liberia, 86 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 762, 763 (2003).
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for universal jurisdiction and for the obligation of the States parties to either try or 
extradite the accused.122
Reference may be made in this context also to Resolution 1483 (2003), which 
extends the rights of the occupying powers in Iraq well beyond what is provided 
in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.123  Indeed, as has been noted, the 
promotion of the welfare of the Iraqi people, the establishment of the Development 
Fund for Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority’s management of petroleum 
and other resources all go beyond the scope of the law of occupation, which 
essentially aims at maintaining the status quo and does not amount to a “license to 
transform.”124  Resolution 1483 also modiﬁed the application of Article 42 of the
Hague Regulations in that, it did not qualify Poland as an occupying power even 
122 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  Under those provisions, contracting 
States are under an obligation either to prosecute the accused of grave breaches, regardless of his/her 
nationality, or to extradite him/her to another contracting party concerned if such a party “has made 
out a prima facie case.” 
123 S.C. Res. 1483, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).  It is well-known that the 
occupying Powers have signiﬁcantly changed the Iraqi political, military and economic system
(Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Adequacy of International Humanitarian Law Rules on Belligerent 
Occupation: To What Extent May Security Council Resolution 1483 be Considered a Model for 
Adjustment?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 497, 503 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007)).  See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 
39: Foreign Investment (2003), that introduces important changes to Iraqi investment law, Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order Number 37: Tax Strategy for 2003 (2003), which revises the tax system, 
and Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 64: Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 
1997 (2004) amending Iraqi company law.  Kolb observes that the Security Council could derogate 
from speciﬁc non-fundamental rules of the law of occupation if the maintenance of international
peace so requires, but not from fundamental rules and not from the whole body en bloc (Robert 
Kolb, Occupation in Iraq Since 2003 and the Powers of the UN Security Council, 90 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 29, 33 (2008)).  Zwanenburg adds that, on the basis of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, “the 
Security Council can derogate from the law of occupation at least with regard to non-peremptory 
norms, but if it does so it should provide an alternative standard of behaviour” (Marten Zwanenburg, 
Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation, 86 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 745, 762-63 (2004)).
124 David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842, 851 (2003).  See generally 
id. at 844-46.  Res. 1483 is however ambiguous, as its paragraph 5 calls “upon all concerned to comply 
fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907” (S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 123).
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though a small area in Southern Iraq was “actually placed under the authority” of 
Polish troops.125  Similarly, Resolution 1546 (2004) considered to be terminated the 
occupation of Iraq as at the end of June 2004 even though little had changed on the 
ground (actual control being the sole factor determining the existence of belligerent 
occupation under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations).126
The above cases raise the question whether the Security Council can set aside 
international humanitarian law when the maintenance of international peace and 
security in its narrow sense so requires.  The preferable answer seems negative.  The 
ICTY made clear that “neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the 
Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law),”127 and it has already been seen 
that the obligation to respect international humanitarian law “in all circumstances” 
is incumbent not only on States but on the United Nations as well.128  In relation to 
Resolution 1483, for instance, the representative of Pakistan in the Security Council 
emphasized that 
under the Charter the powers delegated by the Security Council 
under this resolution are not open-ended or unqualiﬁed.  They
should be exercised in ways that conform with “the principles of 
justice and international law” mentioned in article 1 of the Charter, 
and especially in conformity with the Geneva Conventions and the 
Hague Regulations, besides the Charter itself.129 
Furthermore, in its Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, the 
ICJ maintained that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conﬂict are . . . . to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratiﬁed the
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law.”130  It would indeed be bizarre if States, when acting 
through an international organization, were allowed to derogate from provisions that 
125 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907.  See Kolb, supra note 123, 
at 41-43; Zwanenburg, supra note 123, at 756.
126 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).  See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 273 (2009).  According to Kolb, however, this was a “movable” date 
and the Council’s statement is declaratory, not constitutive (supra note 123, at 44).
127 Tadić, supra note 29, para. 28.
128 Id. para. 93.
129 U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 22, 2003).
130 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 
79 (July 8).
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are “intransgressible” when they act individually.131  In any case, the ICTY clariﬁed
that “most norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those prohibiting 
war crimes … are … peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens, i.e. of a 
non-derogable and overriding character.”132  Whatever one might think of the power 
of the Security Council to derogate from customary international law,133 nobody has 
seriously doubted that resolutions contravening with jus cogens would be null and 
void and therefore not binding on Member States.134
CONCLUSIONS
Fifteen years ago, Judge Schwebel observed that “[c]riticizing the United Nations 
Security Council has been a popular sport since 1946.”135  Some of this criticism is 
131 According to de Wet, “[t]his … would undermine the logic that states cannot confer more 
powers to organs of international organizations than they can exercise themselves” (ERIKA DE WET, 
THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 189 (2004)).  De Wet also suggests 
that, as Article 1 (3) includes among the UN purposes the achievement of international cooperation 
in the solving of international problems of, inter alia, a humanitarian character, “the basic rules of 
international humanitarian law ... constitutes a further limitation on the enforcement powers of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter” (id. at 204).  The fact that the UN has repeatedly 
committed itself to respect international humanitarian law and has contributed to its development has 
also estopped its organs from conduct that would breach its core principles, as “this would constitute 
an act of bad faith on the part of the organisation” (id. at 206).
132 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et. al., Case no. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 520 (Jan. 14, 2000).
133 Several commentators have argued that Article 103 allows the Security Council to overrule 
not only international agreements, but also customary international law.  See, e.g., Rudolf Bernhardt, 
Article 103, in Simma, supra note 41, at 1292, 1299; Report of the Study Group of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n on the Fragmentation of International Law, ﬁnalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 58th 
Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, at 175-176, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006); 
Zwanenburg, supra note 123, at 761; Fassbender, supra note 50, at 586.  See also the Declaration of 
Acting President Oda in the Lockerbie case, supra note 27, at 17, para. I.  Contra, Gaetano Arangio-
Ruiz, Note e Commenti, Article 39 of the ILC First-Reading Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 747, 752 (2000); Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundations of 
the International System, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 232 (1997); Rain Liivoja, The Scope of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 602-08 (2008).
134 See, e.g., the Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Genocide case: “The relief which 
Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conﬂict between one of its
decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot—as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms—
extend to a conﬂict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens” (supra note 32, at 440, 
para. 100).  See also Cannizzaro, supra note 83, at 211-15; DE WET, supra note 131, at 188-89.  The 
problem would however be as to exactly which international humanitarian law provisions would 
have such a fundamental character.
135 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Roles of the Security Council and the International Court of 
Justice in the Application of International Humanitarian Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 731, 732 
(1995).
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undoubtedly fair and is still valid today, at least with regard to the role that the Council 
has been playing in securing compliance with international humanitarian law.  Indeed, 
the Security Council was not conceived as a law enforcer but as a peacekeeper that 
acts on political grounds: a lot depends on the interests of the permanent members and 
the reasons for acting or not acting are often not explained.136  The political nature of 
the Council leads then to enforcement à la carte where certain situations are addressed 
but others are ignored.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the Security Council can never 
play a constructive role in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, 
selective and imperfect as it may be: acting in one case may not be deemed inappropriate 
just because in other similar occasions nothing was done.  The privileged position of 
the Council, which has exclusive competence to take coercive measures involving 
the use of armed force and whose decisions are binding on all UN Member States, 
makes it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, which can at least partly remedy the lack of enforcing mechanisms 
in the treaties on the laws of war, where compliance is mainly based on the goodwill 
of the states parties.  One should also not forget the important role that the Council 
has played in trying to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law by 
non-State actors and in reafﬁrming that the jus in bello was applicable to speciﬁc
conﬂicts and to certain reluctant States: under Article 25 of the UN Charter, such
reafﬁrmations, when adopted under Chapter VII, also broaden the subjective scope of
application of international humanitarian law treaties that are not universally ratiﬁed. 
Finally, the pressure of public opinion arising from a Security Council resolution upon 
the target State should not be underestimated.
It can thus be concluded that, if the primary responsibility for securing compliance 
with international humanitarian law still rests with the belligerents and with 
humanitarian organizations,137 the Security Council can play a complementary role by 
136 As observed by a commentator, the Council’s “composition, procedures and practices are 
completely indefensible if we assume that its tasks extend to assessing and enforcing the conditions 
of good life—including rules of international law—among and within States” (Koskenniemi, supra 
note 19, at 344).
137 See S.C. Resolutions 1674, at 2, 1738 at 1 and 1894, at 1 (supra note 25), on the protection 
of civilians in armed conﬂict, and the presidential statement adopted on January 14, 2009 (S.C. 
Pres. Statement 2009/1, supra note 62).  The primary responsibility of the parties to the conﬂict to
ensure the protection of civilians has also been recalled by several representatives in the Security 
Council debates, e.g., Croatia (S/PV.6151, supra note 56, at 7), Qatar (id. at 29), South Korea (S/
PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 29), United States (S/PV.6066, supra note 99, at 21), 
359ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW2010]
using its broad powers.  The Council’s action, however, by no means could or should 
replace that of other actors, in particular the ICRC.
United Kingdom (id. at 23), United Arab Emirates (S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 7); 
Russian Federation (S/PV.6216, supra note 26, at 16); Tanzania (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6216th mtg. 
(Resumption 1) at 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6216 (Resumption 1) (Nov. 11, 2009); Hungary (id. at 44)). 
Other representatives more generally referred to the primary responsibility of “states” (e.g., Japan 
(S/PV.6151, supra note 56, at 11), Costa Rica (id. at 14), Morocco (S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra 
note 26, at 17), Jordan (id. at 14), Sri Lanka (id. at. 23), Guatemala (id. at 27), Viet Nam (S/PV.6066, 
supra note 99, at 10), Turkey (id. at 12), France (id. at, 25), Colombia (S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), 
supra note 26, at 28), Uruguay (id. at 5), Kenya (id. at. 30), Venezuela (id. at 32); Sudan (S/PV.6216 
(Resumption 1), supra at 42).
